Many contemporary philosophers writing on punishment seek to show that much of the dispute between retributionists and utilitarians springs from a failure on the part of both parties to elucidate the concept of punishment. The writers are usually utilitarians who seek to show that what is true in the retributive theory is simply a point about the concept of punishment, and that for the rest, the morality of punishment is to be explained in terms of the utilitarian theory. Those who (...) attempt to destroy the retributive theory by reducing its element of truth to a mere conceptual point about the concept of punishment, seek to argue that the notion of being guilty of an offence is part of the concept of punishment. Against this kind of approach, I wish to consider whether a general theory of punishment is possible, and if so, what are its basic concepts—punishment, deserving of punishment, deserved, or justifiable punishment—and how they are to be elucidated. I shall be concerned to argue that much contemporary writing on punishment commits the Platonic fallacy of assuming that there is a single, core, paradigm use of ‘punishment’ which is to be found by elucidating the concept of legal punishment. (shrink)

Dr. theol. Ulrich H.J. Körtner ist Professor für Systematische Theologie an der Evangelisch-Theologischen Fakultät der Universität Wien.

The concept of prima facie duty is deemed important by ross and the author. The author thinks ross and others have not elucidated the concept and the relation between prima facie and 'absolute' duty. He concludes that "we must explain the obligatoriness of absolute duties in terms of prima facie duties, As being derived from them, And not vice versa, As ross attempted." (staff).

Has a moral agent really done his duty when he has done what he wronglybelieves to be his duty? Is it right to act in accord with one's beliefs, even when they are mistaken? Or are we always obliged to perform that act which is objectively obligatory? In some such ways as these the problem as to whether one's ‘objective duty’ or one's ‘subjective duty’ is one's real duty has been posed. It might be argued that the objective view is (...) plainly right and that there appears to be a problem only because moral language is here being misused; that the problem is seen to be no problem once we accurately and fully describe acts based on erroneous beliefs. But this is like arguing that there is no problem as to whether the killing of innocent persons is intrinsically wrong, since we can describe each act involving killing in a long-hand way which circumvents the problem concerning the principle. (shrink)

Reinhold Niebuhr, approaching the ethical field as a theologian rather than as a philosopher, has maintained that the Christian ethic is not single and indivisible, but that, on the contrary, it consists of what one might call an absolute ethic and a kind of interim ethic in which the notion of justice is prominent. Without commenting on Niebuhr's work I wish to put forward a view which, although more general than his, is perhaps not without a superficial resemblance to it.

Burgess, J.P. and Rosen, G. Subject with No ObjectElliott, R.Faking Nature.

This paper sets out to answer four apparently unconnected questions, which, however, I hope to show to be parts of one question: Why did Haimon kill himself over the body of Antigone? Why did Philinnion return for three nights to her father's house? Why is it unlawful to leave a story unfinished? Why is a magician sometimes torn in pieces by his own devils, or otherwise destroyed by his own magic?

It is not without a certain feeling of surprise that I find the fragment preserved by Strabo VIII. 3, 20, and somewhat doubtfully ascribed by him to Stesichoros, still commonly attributed to that writer. As the purpose of this note is to give what seem to me cogent reasons for holding that no poem of such a metre and content could be by an author of any possible date earlier than Alexandrian times, I cite the passage of Strabo in full. (...) It runs as follows, and is part of an argument for the existence of an ancient city called Samos in Elis. (shrink)

The very ingenious and closely reasoned article of Mr. L. R. Palmer seems to us to deserve examination, the more so as we totally disagree with his views, both from the point of view of etymology and that of Religionsforschung. To put his conclusions briefly, he supposes mactus to be derived from a hypothetical verb macio, signifying ‘bespatter, sprinkle’; mactus then would properly mean ‘sprinkled’, and might also be used of the substance which was sprinkled or poured, thus accounting for (...) the double construction of the secondary verb mactare. In particular, Mr. Palmer supposes that macte uirtute alludes to the blood with which the warrior thus addressed is besprinkled, and so to his tabu condition. To the whole of this construction we object, holding that the old derivation from the root MAG is correct and that mactus signifies ‘increased’, ‘made greater or stronger’, mactare properly ‘to put someone in the condition of being mactus’, and by an easy transition ‘to sacrifice a victim’. (shrink)

In vol. xxxii of this Journal, pp. 220 ff., we published a rejoinder to Dr. L. R. Palmer's ingenious article in which he derived macte, mactare, and macula from a hypothetical verb *macio ‘to sprinkle’. We objected to this construction, holding that the traditional derivation of macte from the root of magnus was more satisfactory, and discussing in some detail the evidence brought forward by Dr. Palmer in support of his theory. Alas! Dr. Palmer has taken our criticism neither kindly (...) nor seriously, and, while accusing us in his spirited reply of using ribaldry instead of argument, he is himself rather selective in answering our objections. Both this circumstance and the fact that his article contains a number of mistaken assertions compel us to restate our case. (shrink)

An increasingly number of patients in Western civilizations suffer from weak authenticity structure which is characterized by a lack of self-realization, autonomy, character strength, stereotype behavior, inability to use (internal) dialogue in order to learn about oneself and defining oneself as a individual, and so on. In this paper a theoretical model of fragile authenticity structure and some suggestions to regain a more authentic attitude are presented.